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The Development of the London Hospital System, 1823 - 1982 |
The Overview, originally written in 1984/5 has required revision in the light of the many changes in the past twenty-five years. The text that follows is therefore not precisely that of the original book.
Governance and management: devolution versus centralism
Attempts at amalgamation and rationalisationThis text has traced the way in which the London hospital system developed and assumed its present shape. Current dilemmas are in part a legacy of history and the advancement of medical science and part the result of changing circumstance and society. Similar developments have occurred in the centres of other large cities like New York, where wealth and poverty exist side by side and where highly specialised medical services and medical schools have grown up over the centuries. However in the United Kingdom, the sheer size of London's 8 million or so population, its role in government and the media, and its wide ethnic mix, make for a clutch of problems not found elsewhere. It is now time to examine some of the main themes, and the influences which have assisted or obstructed change. The evidence of history is still around us.
The shape of the London hospital system was determined by a number of factors. In the nineteenth century London was the richest city in the world with a rapidly rising population. Medical science was in the ascendant and the London hospitals dominated medicine at least in the UK, a situation now long past. The hospital services of London were extensive and often of the highest quality. The charitable instincts of wealthy citizens, the prestigious and lucrative private practices of the more eminent practitioners, the presence of colleges and institutions of great renown, and the work of those involved in local government all led to the creation in London, as in other major capital cities, of numerous (if poorly distributed) hospitals. Care outside hospital seems to have been stultified by the hospitals, which provided extensive outpatient services and often despised the GPs nearby. The plethora of hospitals and the often poor quality of primary care created problems for later generations and gave rise to much antagonism between the interests threatened.
The pattern of the London hospital system was laid down before the development of modem transport systems or the introduction of the telephone. These made the migration of the population from the centre easier; slum clearances forced many people out of the centre as well and post-war re-housing accelerated this. The reduction in the number of small businesses in central London, the creation of the first council estates on its periphery and the wish of many people to find a better pattern of life in the suburbs, knocked much of the centre out of London, only now to begin to return. Like many parish churches, the central hospitals found themselves serving fewer and fewer local residents. Nevertheless some were rebuilt and many of the teaching hospitals expanded. The development of medicine increased the capacity of the hospitals to help their patients, but investigation and treatment became ever more expensive and total expenditure rose and rose even further as medical education improved and research centres developed. Financial crisis has been a constant threat. It led to demands for better management and injections of public money, followed inevitably by government intervention in administration.
The financial state of London’s hospitals has been one of perennial crisis and remains so today. Before the NHS began, any hospital that found itself in a comfortable position financially would venture on expansion and development, creating new problems. Those under pressure, like The London, would discharge patients more rapidly, thereby increasing throughput and their total costs. Even in thye 21st century this pattern continues. New forms of treatment also increased expenditure. Financial problems affected the size and distribution of the voluntary hospitals since patients could be treated only if money was forthcoming. It was said that a hospital need never despair as long as it was bankrupt, but the plaintive cry of ‘funds urgently needed and beds closed’ led in the end to the belief that the voluntary system was not only insolvent, but might not be worth saving. The municipal hospitals were also under financial pressure as they expanded their services. The problem was tackled in three ways, by attempting to make hospitals more efficient, by seeking new sources of income and in the last 50 years by hospital closure, an accelerated programme of amalgamation and reconfiguration of services. The King’s Fund was founded to raise money for the hospitals but soon found itself working to improve hospital planning and administrative efficiency, so as to try to ensure that its financial contributions were not wasted, and much effort has been expended within the context of the NHS to achieve the same objective.
Prior to World War II it was difficult for the voluntaries to maintain that their system had never been healthier, or treated more patients, while conducting a shroud-waving campaign for money. In time, it was recognised that only a small part of the institutional care needed could be provided by voluntary effort, despite philanthropy. What the voluntaries had created was widely admired and they bore the burden of specialised forms of care and the education of the country’s doctors, but did not provide services for the chronically sick, the mentally ill and the mentally handicapped. Even among sufferers from acute illnesses, the majority had to rely on the massive, if somewhat shoddy, services available on the rates. Though the voluntaries tried to broaden the basis of their support by accepting payment by patients and municipal assistance, their financial position remained insecure. Continual crises led to lengthy debates about the virtues of charity, the capacity of patients to pay, hospital savings schemes, insurance and state support. These only ended when the burden of debt was eventually lifted by the NHS Act (1946)
In December 1920 after its interim report had been published, Dawson’s consultative council concluded that hospital care would never be freely accessible if patients had to pay when they became ill. The council recommended a service free at the time of use.1 Not until after the Second World War was the state prepared to meet the resultant bill. As time passed the role of the hospitals changed. Dowling, writing about the city hospitals of the United States, divides their development into four phases.2 In the ‘poor house’ phase, lasting until about 1869, the welfare functions of the almshouse tended to predominate. In the ‘practitioner’ period which followed, medical and nursing became the dominant functions. From 1910, following Flexner’s report, whole-time medical staff took control, and the education of medical students and nurses became of much greater importance. Finally, from around 1965, there was a tendency for city hospitals to seek to become leaders in the health care of their community. Our own situation has been in some ways different for organisations outwith the hospitals have led in defining health care needs, taking into account the need for good community services. The parallels are however clear. London’s hospitals have similarly broadened their role as the social classes for whom care was provided were extended, the clinical conditions treated steadily increased in number, and educational and research activities developed.
In the nineteenth century it was broadly agreed that the role of the hospitals was to treat those of the sick poor who might recover fairly speedily, while the destitute and the chronic went to poor law institutions. Changing social attitudes and the development of scientific medicine altered this. It became harder to determine whether hospital treatment should be provided on the basis of social class, home care no longer being a viable alternative for the more prosperous. The distinction between the voluntaries, with their tradition of curing the curable, and the poor law infirmaries which cared for the rest, became increasingly distasteful. Preferential admission of the acute sick might have advantages for the doctors and the fund-raisers of the voluntary hospitals, but to transfer the chronic to second-rate institutions was to few people’s liking. It was sometimes argued that this was in the interests of the medical schools, although in fact little priority was given to medical education by the lay governors. The hospital governed the school, and not vice versa. The policy adopted by the King’s Fund in 1905, after the report of the Fry committee, reflected the widely held view that education was a secondary function of hospitals, which were primarily there to care for the sick poor.3
While the voluntary hospitals never abandoned their traditional function of treating the sick poor, the financial crises of the 1920s forced them to open their doors to a wider clientele and to rely increasingly on payment by patients and on the hospital savings associations. The municipal hospitals, as they slowly overcame their association with the poor law, also began to admit patients who were far from destitute, and took some who could afford to contribute towards the cost of their care. A greater variety of social classes came to be found amongst patients, a process culminating in the National Health Service Act (1946), which was intended to remove all barriers of class and open the hospitals to rich and poor on the same terms, free of charge at the time care was required.
The influence of the medical educational establishment first became significant during the Second World War. In line with the concepts of the Goodenough report and the idea of university medical teaching centres, the NHS Act laid a duty on the Minister to provide reasonable facilities for clinical teaching and research. Some of the large local authorities, like the LCC, had traditionally taken an enlightened view of education. Other groups viewed medical schools with mixed feelings. ‘Teaching and research institutions’, said the London community health councils in 1980, ‘not only obscure deficiencies of London’s health care but are, in part, a significant cause of these inadequacies.’4 Medical schools, once opposed by anti-vivisectionists and anti-science lobbies, are still not always welcomed by community-based organisations who may see them as a threat to the development of primary care. Yet their existence influenced health service organisation, for example in the 1990s when the medical schools had amalgamated into five major groupings and more recently with the development of academic medical science centres to encourage new developments to move into general use.
Since 1945 the London medical schools had also had to face the problems of small size, necessitating merger as in the case of hospitals, of a declining population and rising intakes. To provide their students with adequate clinical experience, more teaching has been undertaken in the community, and additional hospitals have been brought into association with the university teaching centres so that virtually all the NHS hospitals in London are used for education. Medical schools have found it necessary to use such complementary hospitals for students, even in the first clinical year, and to establish new academic units away from the main medical school campus. Some of the hospitals now being used first came into association with the medical schools during the 1939-45 war, when the sector system was in operation. This development has continued, alongside the relocation of teaching. St George's alone among the London teaching hospitals moved a substantial distance from the centre to a poorly served area and although the entry at London's medical schools has expanded, the proportion of teaching undertaken in London has steadily fallen as provincial teaching hospitals expanded and new ones were opened.
Governance and management: devolution versus centralism
Governance and management have always been contentious issues. Hospitals have usually been managed either by ad hoc bodies, established specially for that purpose as were the committees of the voluntary hospitals, by elected authorities and their committees, or latterly by a chairman, chief executive and a board of executive and non-executive directors. The recent creation of Foundation Trusts provides yet another variation. Lord Dawson’s council failed to make a recommendation about this because the members could not agree.1 Latterly the governance arrangements seem to have depended on the managerial theory current, rather than any analysis.
As medical science developed in the 19th Century doctors increasingly pressed their claim to board representation. They maintained that since it was their skill which established the reputation of a hospital, they should have a say in its control. From its earliest days The Lancet supported them, opposing ‘closed committees’, which were self-perpetuating, and ‘irresponsible boards’ which could not be called to account by any higher authority. Nonetheless, the general view was that hospital control should be in lay hands, and only in the case of some special hospitals did doctors come to dominate. The profession might provide the skill, but the money usually came from elsewhere. Finance could be the key to governance. A hospital genuinely approaching bankruptcy often elected a new chairman. Management committees formed by a democratic process, like the boards of guardians and the LCC, were generally adamant that doctors, however expert, should not sit as members beside elected representatives. It was not until the NHS Act in 1946 that doctors gained a place on authorities as of right, only to lose this representation in more recent organisational changes in favour of a managerial - rather than an elected - élite. The establishment of Foundation Hospital Trusts has restored doctors to a place on the Board.
Another longstanding debate concerns the degree of devolution or centralism that is necessary in a health system. The battles between the Poor Law Board, the boards of guardians and the Metropolitan Asylums Board are cases in point. The argument for devolution rests upon the need for hospitals to be sensitive to local opinion and local needs. The centralist argument, on the other hand, was well expressed by the Royal Commission on smallpox hospitals, commenting on the Metropolitan Asylums Board in 1882.5
‘It will bring to a focus, and will be able to give instant and extended effect, to all the experience which will otherwise be scattered with various results, among a variety of bodies not always actuated by broad or accurate views. It will also be able to make the different parts of a large system work into each other, not only for the advancement of practical efficiency, but also for the careful observation, collection and publication of facts systematically observed over the large field which their operations cover. Finally, it will probably be able, from its dignity and importance, to command a higher class of administrators. The Board, if it is one, will be the picked men of the metropolis, instead of the picked men of a parish.’
The centralist tendencies of the Local Government Board and the London County Council were partly responsible for the antipathy displayed by the medical profession and the voluntary hospitals to the concept of a central board for London’s hospitals. 50 years later regional health authorities were also wary of London-wide planning mechanisms although their abolition in the late 1990s opened the way for London wide coordination by the strategic health authorities. On a broader canvas, the issue of centralisation of power in Whitehall - hard to avoid in a centrally tax funded system - and devolution of decision making to the periphery, remains hotly contested. From 1997 Labour, while maintaining that power was or would be devolved, micromanaged the NHS locally and it remains uncertain how far the rhetoric of devolution will ever become true reality.
An uneven and incoherent hospital service evolved in London because hospitals were established and managed independently of one another and almost completely ignoring health services outside the hospitals. The voluntaries could not raise enough money, either individually or jointly, to expand fast enough to meet the whole of the increasing demand for hospital care as medical science developed. Thus the rate-supported hospitals also moved into acute care, which had not traditionally been the role of the boards of guardians. As a result the problem of competitive and overlapping services was compounded.
Those funding and administering hospitals services have always been concerned with value for money. The confused system, if it could be called a system, led to repeated calls for economy and efficiency, for cooperation and rationalisation. As early as 1892 the Select Committee of the House of Lords saw the need for cooperation in planning, and the foundation of the King’s Fund (1897) was in part an attempt to provide for this. The requirement was again emphasised by the Cave committee (1920), by Neville Chamberlain when Minister of Health, by the Sankey commission (1937), and by the Nuffield Provincial Hospitals Trust (1941). Unfortunately, because of the multitude of authorities, each with a different view of its role, agreement on issues of a fundamental character could seldom be reached.
The NHS ultimately provided a broader framework for planning, but it too chose to function with many independent authorities, each separately accountable to the Minister. Planning within a single organisation is always simpler than coordinating the planning of separate bodies. The creation of ‘joint planning’ and ‘liaison’ committees is frequently a sign of a basic organisational fault. Progressive reorganisations sometimes attempted to mould the London authorities into a pattern which would make major change possible. In 2002 the establishment of a single region for London (and one that also involved social services and excluded the shire counties) had this aim, but the inherent competition between trusts and particularly foundation trusts acts in the opposite direction.
Attempts at amalgamation and rationalisation
The pressure for a central hospital board in the latter part of the nineteenth century was largely inspired by a desire for better organisation. From 1897 to 1939 the King’s Fund, backed by the prestige of royalty and the power of its monies, made continuous attempts to organise the voluntary hospitals of London into a system and to remedy their deficiencies.
While it has always been accepted that the great teaching hospitals have drawn their patients from long distances as well as from their immediate locality, it has never been argued that, were it possible to start from scratch, so many should be in the centre of London. Removal has, however, always been risky. Institutions seldom sacrifice their existing position, and their autonomy, without hope of considerable benefit. Edward VII praised the altruism of hospitals willing to sacrifice some of their independence for the wider good, but few will consider voluntary euthanasia. Consequently, amalgamation as a method of rationalisation had always been favoured. It is less drastic than closure and therefore more acceptable. It preserves valuable strengths and traditions of the individual institutions, and a role can be found for their supporters in the new organisation. Larger units may be more economic to run, and will provide a better basis for medical education and research. Finally the merger can be combined, if desirable, with a judicious reduction in bed numbers. The efforts of the King’s Fund to achieve amalgamation of small hospitals were followed at the end of the Second World War by further mergers, often because of the effect of war damage. The process is still continuing, fuelled by budget cuts, the migration of population, the falling duration of inpatient stay and the need to create larger units to ensure clinical effectiveness.
With the inauguration of the NHS, the regional hospital boards had to face not merely the problem of forming links between hospitals, but of uniting two hospital systems with different origins and little tradition of working together. One (the municipal system) was highly centralised, poorly staffed, but in geographical terms reasonably well deployed. The other (the voluntaries) had better staffing and a greater ability to initiate new forms of care, but had little in the way of general policies in London and was largely based in the centre where the population was diminishing. The difficulties the regions faced in making sense of this situation were compounded by shortage of building materials and money, the continuing autonomy of the teaching hospitals, and other problems: the remoteness and nature of the mental illness and mental handicap hospitals; the unevenness of primary health care; the lack of many non-acute services for those with long term illnesses; and the problems of the elderly sick in an inner city with a bleak social and physical environment.
Over the first 60 or so years of the NHs, in spite of recurrent financial crises, substantial progress was made in rebuilding and relocating teaching hospitals (though not far enough from the centre), and filling in areas with poor provision by the closure of old hospitals and building a new one (e.g. Newham). This was accompanied by mergers of medical schools, a substantial and continuing reduction in bed numbers, development of day care, and regular re-assessments of where the increasingly specialised services should be located. The process was slowed by local protest and political factors and considerable restructuring of the hospital (and primary care) services in London remains necessary.
These problems, and their recurrence, are in a sense nobody’s fault. The status quo has a momentum of its own; major change sometimes takes place only in the face of force majeure, the emergency hospital service being an example. In the hospital world, as elsewhere, people resisting change frequently do so from the best of motives. Those proposing or resisting change more often than not see only part of the picture: they have ‘their’ patients, clinical service or institution to champion. In dealing with the immediate dilemma, they have sometimes created worse difficulties for a later generation. But why has the multitude of reformers generally been so markedly unsuccessful, and not just in London, in the US healthcare system as well?
One answer, no doubt, is human frailty in the face of complex problems in a very political environment. Reformers do not have a monopoly of wisdom. Some of their proposals have been unsound and it is just as well that they were not implemented. Rebuilding an enlarged Charing Cross Hospital in Shaftesbury Avenue is just one example. Moreover, rationalisation proposals are seldom popular politically. Changing policies, for example on mental illness and the optimal balance of care in hospital and the community, make things more difficult. It would require political skills, determination of a high order and money to win some of the battles that reformers and rationalisers have undertaken - and lost.
The time taken to move from the initial perception of a problem through analysis, discussion and persuasion, to the implementation of change on the ground, is another cause of failure. It takes a while to identify the essence of problems, or even to obtain agreement that difficulties in fact exist. Sometimes an attempt is made to implement a good idea before its time has come. Before all the major changes in the London hospital system there has been an incubation period during which the proposals gradually become established on the agenda of issues for public debate. Indeed a lag of 20 or 30 years has been common. Even then the proposed reform may not occur, perhaps because circumstances have changed meanwhile: problems that were pressing at the start can become insignificant by the end and be replaced by new ones. Infectious diseases, for example, were responsible for entire hospital systems, but quickly waned in importance with the introduction of public health measures. Major revisions in health service funds, in clinical requirements or in medical manpower needs, are drastic changes that can rightly or wrongly halt reform.
Parochialism has been another powerful block on progress. Institutions are capable of remarkable resistance when threatened. Bevan’s creation of 26 groups of teaching hospitals as well as four regional hospital boards in London had inevitable consequences in terms of conflict and delay. For fifty years the four radial regions over-rode the concept of a central health board for London but latterly a London strategic health authority has been developed. Radial regions had the theoretical advantage that a hospital service could be planned not only for Londoners but to provide specialist services for the whole of the south east of England. The opportunity existed to plan for the movement of the population into the home counties, and to reduce provision in inner London. For various reasons neither the boards of the teaching hospitals nor the regions were able, or prepared, to work on this broad canvas. Bevan said that the worst enemy of intelligent planning was a chaos of little and big projects, all aiming at the same end but exhibiting a patch-quilt of local paternalisms.6 The creation of multiple authorities in London produced this effect. Many opportunities were lost, and there remain difficulties from an independence of management.
Much of the problem has been structural in the absence of any single body with untrammelled power to oversee change. When liaison committees have been established they have seldom lasted long enough to follow matters to a conclusion, and at times they have been undermined from within. A consistency of vision and of purpose is essential if an effective system is to be established. Any hospital complex, once built, is likely to set the pattern of care in its locality for a hundred years. There is no difficulty in identifying areas where the decisions taken in the past for short term reasons have closed options for the future. It might have been worth paying a very high price to have avoided the perpetuation of a pattern of hospital care which was clearly outdated; a long term solution might have had a higher immediate cost and yet ultimately have been cheaper.
This underlines the importance of development money or control over service commissioning to facilitate change if potential long-term savings are to be secured. Reform is always slowed, and the arguments for it weakened, if the resources required to effect it are lacking. Moreover, those whose cooperation is being sought look for tangible short-term gains as part of the package of reform. The major realignment of a health system, of the kind London has needed for a long time, cannot be simultaneously sensitive, rapid and cheap.
In recent years the hospital and educational systems in London have been changing at an unprecedented rate. Smaller institutions have all but disappeared as a result of amalgamation for financial reasons. The London Advisory Group believed it was sensible to concentrate care in larger units which could offer a full range of supporting services. This principle was carried forward into the Tomlinson Report but then Turnberg signalled a change in direction. Around 1998 the number of beds available to residents of the London boroughs was recognised as too few and expanding of capacity became a short term goal.
New problems continue to emerge and the reports by Lord Darzi have the merit of a clinical foundation and an accent on the quality of services.7 Financial difficulties, that seem to arise every ten or so years, continue to do so. There remain great strengths in London hospital medicine, which by any standard should be preserved as foundations for the future. Working in London’s hospitals, and managing them, has never been easy, nor will it be in the future.
1 PRO/MH/73/49, minutes of meeting of 17 December 1920.
2 Dowling H F. City hospitals. Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1982.
3 Report of the Committee appointed to enquire into the financial relationship between hospitals and medical schools in London. (Chairman: Sir Edward Fry). London, King’s Fund, 1905.
4 Davidson N. Chronic and critical. London, Community Health Councils in London, 1980.
5 Hospitals commission on the smallpox and fever hospitals of London. London, HMSO, 1882.
6 Bevan A. In place of fear. London, MacGibbon and Kee. 1952.
7 Darzi A. A framework for action. Healthcare for London, 2007.
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